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Abstract
In the 1990s, the empirical relationship between money demand and interest rates
began to fall apart. We analyze to what extent nancial innovations can explain this
breakdown. For this purpose, we construct a microfounded monetary model with a
money market which provides insurance against liquidity shocks by o¤ering short-term
loans and by paying interest on money market deposits. We calibrate the model to
U.S. data and nd that the introduction of the sweep technology at the beginning of
the 1990s, which improved access to money markets, can explain the behavior of money
demand very well. Furthermore, by allowing a more e¢ cient allocation of money, the
welfare cost of ination decreased substantially.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The behavior of M1 money demand, dened to be the ratio of M1 to GDP, began to change
substantially at the beginning of the 1990s. Up until the 1990s, money demand and nominal
interest rates had remained in a stable negative relationship. Since then, the empirical
relationship between M1 and the movements in interest rates began to fall apart and has not
been restored since (Lucas and Nicolini 2013).
 INSERT FIGURE 1 
In Figure 1, we plot the relationship between M1 money demand and the AAA interest
rate in the United States from 1950 until 2013. The black curve displays this relationship
from 1950 until 1989, while the blue curve displays it from 1990 until 2013. The green curve
shows M1 money demand adjusted for retail sweeps (M1S, hereafter) from 1990 to 2013.1
The elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate is denoted by  in the
legend of Figure 1. While the elasticity is  =  0:62 in the period between 1950 and 1989, it
decreased rapidly thereafter. In the post-1990 data, the elasticity of M1 is  = 0:16 and the
elasticity of M1S is  =  0:31.
What accounts for this shift and the lower interest rate elasticity of money demand? It
is well documented that changes in regulations and advances in information technology in
the 1980s and 1990s allowed for new nancial products that a¤ected the demand for money
(Teles and Zhou 2005).2 A case in point for this advance in information technology is the
sweep technology, which essentially consists of software used by banks that automatically
moves funds from checking accounts to MMDAs (Lucas and Nicolini 2013, p. 5).3 In
the retail sector, retail sweep accounts were introduced in 1993 around the time when the
empirical relationship between money demand and the movements in interest rates began
to fall apart. Thus, the emergence of retail sweep accounts can be viewed as a prototypical
technical innovation in the nancial sector that might explain the break in money demand.
In order to explain the behavior of money demand, we rst construct a microfounded
monetary model with a money market.4 In the model, agents face idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks which generate an ex-post ine¢ cient allocation of the medium of exchange: some
agents will hold cash but have no current need for it, while other agents will hold insu¢ cient
cash for their liquidity needs. The money market provides insurance against these liquidity
shocks by o¤ering short-term loans and by paying interest on money market deposits. This
improves the allocation and a¤ects the shape of the money demand function.
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We then explore what changes in nancial intermediation in the model are needed to
replicate the behavior of money demand as observed in the data. From a theoretical point
of view, innovations in nancial markets can a¤ect money demand via two channels. First,
innovations may allow agents to earn a higher interest rate on their transaction balances. In
doing so, such innovations make holding the existing money stock more attractive. Second,
nancial innovations may allocate the stock of money more e¢ ciently. In the paper, we show
that the rst channel is responsible for the reduction in the elasticity of money demand, while
the second channel is responsible for the observed downward shift. The combination of both
e¤ects shifts the money demand curve downwards and makes it less elastic. In the model, an
exogenous increase in money market participation generates both e¤ects since an increase in
money market participation allows more agents to earn interest on their idle money holdings
and it improves the allocation of the medium of exchange.
To study to what extent nancial innovation can account for the observed behavior of
money demand, we calibrate the model by using U.S. data from 1950 to 1989. In doing
so, we assume that during this period no agent participates in the money market (0 = 0),
where market participation is captured by the money market access probability . We then
perform the following experiment: We search numerically for the value of  that minimizes the
squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data. We nd that under
competitive pricing a value of 1 = 0:60 replicates the observed break in money demand
best.5
 INSERT FIGURE 2 
Figure 2 displays the main result of the paper. In this gure, we plot the empirical money
demand and the model-implied money demand, by assuming an increase in the money market
access from 0 = 0 to 1 = 0:60 in 1990. The models money demand, which is plotted against
the interest rate, shifts downwards and becomes less elastic after the 1990s. In particular,
in the period spanning 1990 to 2013, the model generates the same average money demand
as observed in the data, while we obtain an elasticity of money demand of  =  0:40 as
compared to the empirical elasticity of  =  0:31.
In a further experiment, we set the initial value of the access probability to 0 = 0:2,
recalibrate the model, and then increase the access probability to 1 = 1. In this case, the
model is also able to replicate the empirical velocity of money, and the models elasticity is
statistically not di¤erent from the empirical counterpart at the 95% condence level. Thus,
by changing a single parameter, the probability that any individual agent gains access to
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the money market, we are able to explain two separate facts: rst, that the average velocity
increases and, second, that the interest elasticity of money demand decreases when the data
are compared, before and after 1990.
In the paper, we focus on money demand adjusted for sweeps (M1S) for the following
reason. Banks use the sweep technology to automatically move funds from checking accounts
(included in the denition of M1) into MMDAs (not included in the denition of M1). Such
sweeps reduce banks required reserves while leaving unchanged its customersperceived
holdings of transaction deposits (Anderson and Rasche 2001, p. 51). Thus, for a customer,
these funds are as liquid as money in a deposit account, since they are automatically swept
back in case they are required for payments. Accordingly, M1S represents the available
transaction media in the economy more accurately than M1. Since the stock of money in
our model is equal to the models stock of transaction media, we map the models money
demand to the empirical money demand adjusted for sweeps.
Deposit-sweeping software was introduced by banks to lower reserve requirements. Van-
Hoose and Humphrey (2001) nd that the introduction of retail sweep accounts reduced
required reserves by more than 70 percent between 1995 and 2000. Anderson and Rasche
(2001) nd that the sweep technology made the economic burden of reserve requirements
zero.6 The funds released by the reduction of required reserves is invested in consumer and
business loans (Anderson and Rasche 2001 p. 57). This means that the sweep technology
made more funds available for lending. We model the same mechanism, with an exogenous
increase in money market participation. Under this increase, agents that had previously no
access to the money market, can suddenly use it either for investing their idle money or for
taking out short-term loans.
In practice, banks did not pass on most of the interest earnings to customers, as the
customers did not fully understand the sweeping process (see Anderson and Rasche 2001 p.
56). In contrast, in our model, we assume that the money market is perfectly competitive.
Consequently, banks pass on the entire earnings to depositors. To address the issue that
in practice depositors earned less than under perfect competition, we also consider the case
where agents do not earn interest in the money market, but they continue to receive loans
against interest. We show that this change mainly a¤ects the elasticity of money demand,
while the model still does a good job in matching the observed downward shift in money
demand.
We also nd that the welfare cost of ination is considerably lower when we calculate it
with our new theoretical money demand function as opposed to traditional models that do
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not take into account the recent changes in money demand. In fact, for any pricing protocol,
we nd that the welfare cost of ination is considerably smaller after 1990 than before.
Finally, our paper also makes a theoretical contribution by introducing limited participation
into BCW. As mentioned above, limited participation a¤ects the money demand function in
an interesting way.
Literature The behavior of money demand is very well documented in Lucas and Nicolini
(2013) and Teles and Zhou (2005), who also discuss the regulatory changes that occurred
in the 1980s and 1990s. Lucas and Nicolini (2013) carefully think about what objects serve
as means of payment and need to be included into M1. They then dene a new monetary
aggregate called NewM1. Similar to M1S, this aggregate adds MMDAs to the traditional
components of M1. They then show that there is a stable long-run relationship between the
NewM1 and the relevant opportunity cost of holding the various components of NewM1. We
will discuss this paper in more detail in Section 7.
In the course of our research, we reviewed papers that study money demand and, in
particular, those that explore the break in money demand that occurred in the 1990s. They
often involve Baumol-Tobin style inventory-theoretic models of money (e.g., Attanasio, Guiso
and Jappelli 2002, and Alvarez and Lippi 2009). Lucas and Nicolini (2013), Ireland (2009),
Teles and Zhou (2005) and Reynard (2004) are more recent attempts to explain the behavior
of money demand. Papers that use the search approach to monetary economics are Faig
and Jerez (2007), and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011). In Section 7, we discuss the
above-mentioned papers in more detail.
Another related branch of the literature are papers that study the welfare cost of ination
in monetary models with trading frictions; see, e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005), Aruoba, Ro-
cheteau and Waller (2007), Craig and Rocheteau (2008), and Chiu and Molico (2010), among
many others.7 Some other related papers study issues such as credit card use (Telyukova and
Wright 2008, and Rojas-Breu 2013) and its e¤ect on money demand (Telyukova 2013), and
the impact of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks on money demand over the business cycle
(Telyukova and Visschers 2013). The main focus of our work is to investigate the quantitative
e¤ects of nancial innovation on steady state money demand and velocity.
5
2 ENVIRONMENT
There is a [0; 1] continuum of innitely-lived agents.8 Time is discrete, and in each period
there are three markets that open sequentially: a money market, where agents can borrow
and deposit money; a goods market, where production and consumption of a specialized good
take place; and a centralized market, where credit contracts are settled and a general good
is produced and consumed. All goods are nonstorable, which means that they cannot be
carried from one market to the next.
At the beginning of each period, agents receive two i.i.d. shocks: a preference shock and an
entry shock. The preference shock determines whether an agent can consume or produce the
specialized good in the goods market: with probability n, he can produce but not consume,
while with probability 1   n, he can consume but not produce. We refer to producers as
sellers and to consumers as buyers. The entry shock determines whether an agent has access
to a frictionless money market. Agents who have access to the money market are called active
(probability ), while agents who have no access are called passive (probability 1  ).
In the goods market, buyers and sellers meet at random and bargain over the terms of
trade. The matching process is described according to a reduced-form matching function,
M (n; 1  n), where M is the number of trade matches in a period. We assume that the
matching function has constant returns to scale, and is continuous and increasing with respect
to each of its arguments. Let  (n) =M (n; 1  n) (1  n) 1 be the probability that a buyer
meets a seller, and s (n) =  (n) (1  n)n 1 be the probability that a seller meets a buyer.
In what follows, we suppress the argument n and refer to  (n) and s (n) as  and s,
respectively.
In the goods market, a buyer receives utility u(q) from consuming q units of the specialized
good, where u(q) satises u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +1, and u0(1) = 0. A seller incurs
a utility cost c (q) = q from producing q units. Furthermore, agents are anonymous, and
agentsactions are not publicly observed. These assumptions mean that an agents promise
to pay in the future is not credible, and sellers require immediate compensation for their
production. Therefore, a means of exchange is needed for transactions.
The general good can be produced and consumed by all agents and is traded in a fric-
tionless, centralized market. Agents receive utility U(x) from consuming x units, where
U 0 (x) ; U 00 (x) > 0; U 0 (0) = 1, and U 0 (1) = 0. They produce the general good with a
linear technology, such that one unit of x is produced with one unit of labor, which gen-
erates one unit of disutility h. This assumption eliminates the wealth e¤ect, which makes
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the end-of-period distribution of money degenerate (see Lagos and Wright 2005). Agents dis-
count between, but not within, periods. Let  2 (0; 1) be the discount factor between two
consecutive periods.
There exists an object, called money, that serves as a medium of exchange. It is perfectly
storable and divisible, and has no intrinsic value. The supply of money evolves according to
the low of motion Mt+1 = Mt, where    denotes the gross growth rate of money and Mt
the stock of money in t. In the centralized market, each agent receives a lump-sum transfer
Tt = Mt+1  Mt = (   1)Mt. To economize on notation, next-period variables are indexed
by +1, and previous-period variables are indexed by  1.
The money market is modeled similar to the one in BCW. In the money market, perfectly
competitive nancial intermediaries take deposits and make loans, which allows agents to
adjust their money balances before entering the goods market. In particular, an agent with
high liquidity needs can borrow money, while an agent with low liquidity needs can deposit
money and earn interest. All credit contracts are one-period contracts and are redeemed in
the centralized market. Financial intermediaries operate a record-keeping technology that
keeps track of all agentspast credit transactions at zero cost. Perfect competition among
nancial intermediaries in the money market implies that the deposit rate, id, is equal to the
loan rate, i`. Throughout the paper, the common nominal interest rate is denoted by i.
Following BCW, we make the following assumptions about commitment. Firstly, we
assume limited commitment in the goods market, which rules out bilateral trade credit among
agents. Secondly, we assume full commitment of borrowers via banks. These assumptions
allow for the coexistence of at money and credit. In this paper, we generalize BCW by
assuming that only a fraction,   1, of agents have access to the money market in each
period.9
3 AGENTSS DECISIONS
In what follows, we present the agentsdecision problems within a representative period, t.
We proceed backwards, moving from the last to the rst market. All proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
The centralized market. In the centralized market, agents can consume and produce the
centralized market good x. Furthermore, they receive money for their deposits plus interest
payments. Additionally, they have to pay back their loans plus interest. An agent entering
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the centralized market with m units of money, ` units of loans, and d units of deposits has
the value function V3(m; `; d). He solves the following decision problem
V3(m; `; d) = max
x;h;m+1
U(x)  h+ V1(m+1); (1)
subject to the budget constraint
x+ m+1 = h+ m+ T +  (1 + i) d   (1 + i) `; (2)
where h denotes hours worked and  denotes the price of money in terms of the general
good. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), we show in the Appendix that the choice of m+1 is
independent of m. As a result, each agent exits the centralized market with the same amount
of money, and, thus, the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the beginning of a
period.
The goods market. In the goods market, the terms of trade are described by the pair
(q; z), where q is the amount of goods produced by the seller and z is the amount of money
exchanged. Here, we present the generalized Nash bargaining solution. In the Appendix,
we also consider Kalai bargaining and competitive pricing. The Nash bargaining problem is
given by
(q; z) = argmax [u(q)  z] ( q + z)1  s.t. z  m: (3)
If the buyers constraint is binding, the solution is given by z = m and
m = g (q)  qu
0(q) + (1  )u(q)
u0(q) + 1   : (4)
If the buyers constraint is not binding, then u0 (q) = 1 or q = q, and z = m = g(q
)

.10
The money market. At the beginning of each period, an agent learns his type; that is,
whether he is a buyer or seller and his participation status in the money market (active or
passive). Let V b1 (m) and V
s
1 (m) be the value functions of an active buyer and an active seller,
respectively, in the money market. Furthermore, V b2 (m+ `; `) denotes the value function of
a buyer at the beginning of the goods market with m+ ` units of money and ` units of loans,
and V s2 (m  d; d) denotes the value function of a seller at the beginning of the goods market
with m   d units of money and d units of deposits. Accordingly, the value function of an
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agent at the beginning of each period is
V1 (m) = 

(1  n)V b1 (m) + nV s1 (m)

+ (1  ) (1  n)V b2 (m; 0) + nV s2 (m; 0) : (5)
An agent in the money market is an active buyer with probability  (1  n), an active
seller with probability n, a passive buyer with probability (1  ) (1  n), and a passive
seller with probability (1  )n. Passive agents in the money market just wait for the goods
market to open, so their value functions in the money market are V b2 (m; 0) and V
s
2 (m; 0),
respectively.
An active buyers optimization problem in the money market is
V b1 (m) = max
`
V b2 (m+ `; `) ; (6)
and an active sellers optimization problem in the money market is
V s1 (m) = max
d
V s2 (m  d; d) s:t: m  d  0: (7)
The constraint in (7) means that a seller cannot deposit more money than the amount he
has. Let s be the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. As we will see below, the nature
of the equilibrium will depend on whether this constraint is binding or not.
In an economy with full commitment of borrowers via banks, there are two types of
equilibria: an equilibrium where active sellers do not deposit all their money (i.e., s = 0),
and another equilibrium where active sellers deposit all their money (i.e., s > 0). We refer
to these equilibria as the type-A and type-B equilibrium, respectively.
3.1 Type-A equilibrium
In the type-A equilibrium, active sellers do not deposit all their money. For this to hold,
sellers must be indi¤erent between depositing their money and not depositing it. This can
be the case if, and only if, i = 0. In what follows, we denote the consumption quantity of an
active buyer by q^ and the consumption quantity of a passive buyer by q.
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Proposition 1 A type-A equilibrium is a list fi; q^; q; `g satisfying
g(q^) = g(q) + `; (8)
i = 

u0(q^)
g0 (q^)
  1

; (9)
i = 0; (10)
   

= (1  ) (1  n) 

u0(q)
g0 (q)
  1

: (11)
According to Proposition 1, in a type-A equilibrium, the following holds. From (8), the
real amount of money an active buyer spends in the goods market, g(q^), is equal to the
real amount of money spent as a passive buyer, g(q), plus the real loan an active buyer
gets from the bank, `. Equation (8) is derived from the active buyers budget constraint
and immediately shows that in this equilibrium q^ > q. An active buyers consumption
satises equation (9), which is derived from the rst-order condition for the choice of loans,
`. Equation (10) is derived from the sellers deposit choice in the money market. In the proof
of Proposition 1, we show that the rst-order condition is i = s, and since s = 0, we have
i = 0; together with (9), this implies u0(q^) = g0 (q^). From (11), a passive buyer consumes an
ine¢ ciently low quantity of goods in the goods market unless  = . This last equation is
derived from the choice of money holdings in the centralized market.
As in BCW, to obtain the rst-best allocation q^ = q = q, the central bank needs to set
 = . Note further that as  ! 1, q ! 0. The reason for this is the following: if the chance
that agents have no access is small, then the value of money is small as well. However, note
that as  ! 1, the economy does not remain in the type-A equilibrium. Rather, it switches
to the type-B equilibrium as explained below.
3.2 Type-B equilibrium
In the type-B equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money at the bank, and so the
deposit constraint is binding; i.e., s > 0. For this to hold, the nominal interest rate must be
strictly positive. In this case, we have:
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Proposition 2 A type-B equilibrium is a list fi; q^; q; `g satisfying
g(q^) = g(q) + `; (12)
i = 

u0(q^)
g0 (q^)
  1

; (13)
g (q) = (1  n) g (q^) ; (14)
   

= 

u0(q^)
g0 (q^)
  1

+ (1  ) (1  n) 

u0(q)
g0 (q)
  1

: (15)
Equations (12), (13), and (15) in Proposition 2, have the same meaning as their counter-
parts in Proposition 1. In contrast, equation (10) must be replaced by the market clearing
condition in the money market (14).
Let  be the value of  such that equations (11) and (15) hold simultaneously; i.e.,
u0(q^) = g0 (q^). Then, the following holds: (i) for any  <   , then s = 0; (ii) for any
 > , then s > 0.
3.3 Discussion
With partial access to the money market, the quantities of goods consumed by active and by
passive buyers are represented by the two loci drawn on the right-hand side graph of Figure
3. To draw this gure, we assume  = 1 and a linear cost function c(q) = q.11 The dotted
(solid) line denotes the quantity consumed by an active (passive) buyer as a function of .
 INSERT FIGURE 3 
In the type-A equilibrium (  ), an active buyers consumption is independent of 
and equal to q, while a passive buyers consumption is decreasing in  and smaller than
q unless  = . In the type-B equilibrium ( > ), both the active and passive buyers
consumption is decreasing in . The dotted vertical line that separates the two equilibria
intersects the horizontal axis at  = . How does  change in the rate of participation ? Our
numerical examples show that  is decreasing in  with  !  as  ! 1. Hence, with full
participation, the type-A equilibrium exists under the Friedman rule only, while the type-B
equilibrium exists for any  > . The graph on the left-hand side of Figure 3 shows the
consumed quantities for the full participation case (i.e.,  = 1). In this case, all agents are
active, and the rst-best consumption is achieved at the Friedman rule.
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4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We choose a model period of one year. The functions u(q), U(x), and c(q) have the forms
u (q) = q1 =(1   ), U (x) = A log(x), and c(q) = q, respectively. Regarding the matching
function, we follow Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and chooseM(B; S) = BS=(B + S), where
B = 1   n is the measure of buyers, and S = n is the measure of sellers. Therefore, the
matching probability of a buyer in the goods market, , is equal to measure of sellers; i.e.,
 = n.
The parameters to be identied are the following: (i) the preference parameters ; A;
and ; (ii) the technology parameters n and ; (iii) the bargaining weight ; and (iv) the
policy parameter ib.12 To identify these parameters, we use quarterly U.S. data from the rst
quarter of 1950 to the fourth quarter of 1989. All data sources are provided in the Appendix.
 INSERT TABLE 1 
The three parameters , n, and ib can be set equal to their equivalent targets. The nominal
interest rate in the settlement market, ib = =   1 = 0:07, matches the average yield on
AAA corporate bonds. We set  = (1 + r) 1 = 0:974 so that the models real interest rate
matches the empirical counterpart, r = 0:027, where r is measured as the di¤erence between
the AAA corporate bonds yield and the change in the consumer price index. In order to
maximize the number of matches, we set n = 0:5.13
The three parameters A, , and  are obtained by matching the average velocity of money,
the elasticity of money demand, and the goods sector mark-up simultaneously. We do this
by minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between the target values and the respective
model-generated moments. With this calibration strategy we are able to hit the three targets
exactly. The average velocity of money before 1990 is v = 5:22.14 The elasticity of money
demand with respect to the AAA corporate bond is  =  0:619. We estimate  by using
ordinary least squares and a log-log specication. The markup in the goods market is  = 0:3,
which represents an average value used in related studies.15
The models velocity of money is
v =
Y
M 1
=
A+ (1  n)  [g(q^) + (1  ) g(q)]
g(q)
;
which depends on i via q and q^, and on  via the function g(q) and g(q^).16 As for the
empirical elasticity, the models elasticity of money demand is estimated by ordinary least
12
squares and a log-log specication. The models markup in the goods market is given by the
real amount of money exchanged in a bilateral match divided by the production cost; i.e.,
g(q^)=c(q^) + (1  ) g(q)=c(q)  1:
With probability , a buyer has access to the money market and buys q^ units of goods for m^
units of money in the goods market. The real value of money he exchanges with the seller
is m^ = g(q^). The seller has real costs c(q^) to produce q^. So in this case, the markup is
g(q^)=c(q^). With probability 1   , a buyer has no access to the money market and gets q
units of goods for m units of money, in which case the markup is g(q)=c(q).
Our targets discussed above, and summarized in Table 1, are su¢ cient to calibrate all
but one parameter: the money market access probability . For the baseline calibration,
we calibrate the above-specied parameters for the period from 1950 to 1989 under the
assumption that 0 = 0, where the index 0 indicates the initial value of . Further below,
we also consider various other initial values for 0. In each case, we set up the following
test for the model: by changing the single parameter, , from its initial value 0 to some
new value 1, we want to be able to explain two separate facts: that the average velocity of
money increases, but that the interest elasticity of money demand decreases when the data
are compared, before and after 1990.
Table 2 presents the calibration results for Nash bargaining, Kalai bargaining, and com-
petitive pricing. Under Kalai bargaining, g (q) in (4) is replaced by gK (q)  q+(1  )u(q).
For competitive pricing, we set  = 1.17
 INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2 also displays the welfare cost of ination, 1 , which is the percentage of total
consumption agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with a nominal
interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent.18 Under competitive pricing, the welfare cost
of ination is roughly 1.23 percent, which is in line with the estimates in Craig and Rocheteau
(2008), and Rocheteau and Wright (2005, 2009). For the other trading mechanisms, the
welfare cost of ination is higher, due to the holdup problem under bargaining. In particular,
we obtain the highest estimate under Nash bargaining, with a number equal to 1.96 percent
of the steady state level of total consumption. In all cases, the goods-market share of total
output, sGM ; is equal to 4:8 percent, which is in line with the estimates in Aruoba, Waller
and Wright (2011), and Lagos and Wright (2005).
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4.1 One-time increase in  in 1990
We now investigate the extent to which the improved liquidity provision in the 1990s accounts
for the observed behavior of money demand. For this, we consider how a one-time increase in
 in 1990 a¤ects the money demand and the welfare cost of ination. We assume that in 1990
the access probability to the money market increased from 0 = 0 to 1 = 1, while keeping all
other parameters at their calibrated values. Then, we feed in the actual path of the nominal
interest rate to simulate the model. This allows us to calculate the model-implied money
demand properties and the welfare cost of ination for the period from the rst quarter of
1990 to the fourth quarter of 2013. The simulation results are provided in Table 3 below.
 INSERT TABLE 3 
Table 3 shows that the increase in the access probability to the money market results in a
substantial reduction in the welfare cost of ination. For example, under competitive pricing,
the welfare cost of ination decreases from 1.23 percent to 0.53 percent. Furthermore, the
model proves competent in replicating the higher velocity of money and the lower elasticity
of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate. An increase from 0 = 0 to 1 = 1
reduces the elasticity of money demand from -0.62 to -0.33 under competitive pricing, while it
increases the velocity from 5.22 to 7.11. For comparison, in the post-1990 data, we obtain an
empirical velocity of v = 6:41 and an empirical elasticity of  =  0:31 with a 95% condence
interval of f 0:355; 0:270g.
To illustrate the implications of the model, we show the simulated money demand under
competitive pricing in Figure 4.
 INSERT FIGURE 4 
Figure 4 shows that the model works well in replicating the lower and less elastic money
demand that occurred in the 1990s by increasing the access probability from 0 = 0 to 1 = 1.
In particular, the model-implied elasticity is not di¤erent from the post-1990 data at the 95%
condence level, but the model-implied money demand is too low.
4.2 Optimal value of 1
A one-time increase in  from 0 = 0 to 1 = 1 results in a model-implied money demand
which is too low compared to the data. In what follows, we identify the value of 1, labelled
1, that best ts the data. For this purpose, we search numerically for the value of  that
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minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data. As
before, we assume that there was one-time increase in  from 0 = 0 to 1 in 1990, while
keeping all other parameters at their calibrated values. The simulation results are shown in
Table 4.
 INSERT TABLE 4 
The estimated velocity comes closer to its observed value when considering the optimal
increase rather than the zero-to-one increase in , while the gap between the models and the
observed money demand elasticity increases. In particular, the elasticity of money demand
in the data and in the model are now di¤erent at the 95% condence level, which was
not the case before. Furthermore, the welfare cost of ination is higher under the optimal
market access shift than it is under the zero-to-one shift. For example, under competitive
pricing, the welfare cost of ination increases from 0:53 percent with 1 = 1 to 0:69 percent
with 1 = 0:60. Table 4 also shows the critical interest rate, i, that separates the type-A
equilibrium from the type-B equilibrium. For all the trading protocols, we nd that i is close
to 2.5 percent, and thus our estimates of the welfare cost of ination are not a¤ected by the
type-A equilibrium. The simulated money demand properties under competitive pricing are
shown in Figure 5.
 INSERT FIGURE 5 
Our numerical results indicate that the improved liquidity provision by nancial interme-
diaries (1 > 0) can replicate the observed shift in money demand and the lower elasticity of
money demand to a large extent.
4.3 Initial value 0 > 0
In the previous section, the key question is whether there is a value 1 that can be set
to match the post-1990 statistics of 6:41 for the average velocity and  0:31 for the money
demand elasticity. In the previous section, we match the number for the average velocity
exactly. But while the interest elasticity of money demand falls in absolute value, it only
drops to  0:40 (for competitive pricing), which is statistically di¤erent from  0:31 at the
95% condence level. In this section, we show that we can improve the models performance
by assuming that the initial value 0 is larger than 0 in the period from 1950 to 1989.
In particular, we calibrate the model with the initial values of 0 = 0:2; 0:4; 0:6 and 0:8.
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Thereafter, we assume that in 1990 there was a one-time shift in  from the initial value 0
to 1 = 1. For this experiment, we assume competitive pricing in the goods market. The
calibration and simulation results are shown in Table 5 below.
 INSERT TABLE 5 
With an initial value of 0 = 0:2, the model is able to replicate the behavior of money
demand in the post-1990 period. In particular, the model-implied elasticity with 1 = 1 is not
di¤erent from the elasticity in the data at the 95% condence level, and the model-implied
level of velocity is only slightly too low. The simulated money demand properties with an
initial value of 0 = 0:2 are shown in Figure 6.
 INSERT FIGURE 6 
Increasing the initial value of 0 results in a lower calibrated value of  and A. This
tends to increase the welfare cost of ination slightly. The simulation results highlight that
a higher initial value of 0 results in a less pronounced shift, and the elasticity of money
demand remains higher. Intuitively, a higher initial value of 0 results in a higher welfare
cost of ination after the one-time shift to 1 = 1.
4.4 Discussion
As discussed in several instances throughout the paper, the introduction of the sweep tech-
nology in the 1990s had two e¤ects. First, it e¤ectively allowed agents to earn interest on
their transaction balances. Second, it allowed for a more e¢ cient allocation of money in the
economy. Our money market also displays these two e¤ects. It is, therefore, straightfor-
ward to study these two e¤ects in isolation in our model. We rst study the counterfactual
experiment of paying interest on money without reallocating liquidity with regard to the
relationship between M1S money demand and the triple AAA interest rate. We, then, per-
form the counterfactual experiment in which the money market reallocates liquidity without
paying interest on money. Finally, in the last subsection, we also show that our model can
reasonably replicate the behavior of M1.
4.4.1 The e¤ects of paying interest on money
In this subsection, we assume that agents earn interest on their idle money holdings, but
that no credit is available. This means that no cash is reallocated. To avoid introducing any
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additional distortion, the interest rate on idle money is nanced via lump-sum taxes. With
these assumptions, equation (15) can be rewritten as follows
   

= (1  n) 

u0(q)
g0 (q)
  1

+ ni;
where i is assumed to be exogenous and set equal to the endogenous interest rate that we
obtain in the unrestricted model. That is, we allow agents to earn the same interest rates as
they do under the experiment described in Figure 5. We assume that there was a one-time
shift in  from 0 = 0 to 1 = 0:60 in 1990. The simulation results are displayed in Figure 7
below.
 INSERT FIGURE 7 
Intuitively, the possibility to earn interest payments on idle money holdings increases the
demand for money, as it reduces the opportunity cost of holding money. This shifts the money
demand function up and reduces its elasticity (see the curve labeled No Credit: 1 = 0:60,
 =  0:39). In particular, with no credit and 1 = 0:60, the velocity of money decreases
to 4:42 and the elasticity of money demand decreases to  0:39 as compared to the money
demand properties with the initial value of 0 = 0, where we obtain v = 5:22 and  =  0:62.
4.4.2 The e¤ects of reallocating the medium of exchange
Here, we continue to assume the existence of a money market that reallocates money, but
we articially hold the interest rate for depositors at zero. By doing so, the market clearing
condition in the money market continues to hold; i.e., g (q) = (1  n) g (q^). Furthermore,
equation (15) can be rewritten as follows
   

= (1  n) 



u0(q^)
g0 (q^)
  1

+ (1  )

u0(q)
g0 (q)
  1

:
Using the calibrated parameter values and assuming that there was a one-time shift in  from
0 = 0 to 1 = 0:60 in 1990, we obtain the simulation results shown in Figure 8.
 INSERT FIGURE 8 
Figure 8 shows that in this case the velocity increases signicantly to 7:16 (see the curve
labeled No Interest: 1 = 0:60,  =  0:61), while the elasticity of money demand remains
essentially at the initial value with 0 = 0, where we obtain  =  0:62.
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To summarize, the money markets more e¢ cient allocation of money is the driving force
behind the downward shift in money demand, while the possibility to earn interest on idle
money is the driving force behind the reduction in the elasticity of money demand.
4.4.3 Di¤erence between M1 and M1S
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on money demand adjusted for retail sweeps
(M1S), because it represents the available transaction media in the economy more accurately
than M1. In what follows, we show that our model can also reasonably replicate the behavior
of M1. In order to show this, we need to identify which fraction of the stock of money in the
model is M1.
In practice, M1S includes the funds from demand deposit accounts that are automatically
transferred into MMDAs by means of the sweep technology. In our model, the funds allocated
to MMDAs are equal to the amount that active sellers deposit. Hence, M1 in the model is
equal to M1S minus these deposits. The real value of M1S in the model is equal to the real
stock of money M = g(q). The real value of all deposits is nM = ng(q). Consequently,
the real value of M1 in the model is M1 = M   nM = (1  n)g(q).
To study the properties of M1 money demand in the model, we again assume that there
was a one-time increase in  from 0 = 0 to 1 = 0:6 in 1990. The simulation results are
shown in Figure 9, where we use competitive pricing in the goods market and the parameter
values calibrated to the 1950 to 1989 period.
 INSERT FIGURE 9 
Figure 9 shows that our model does a good job in matching M1 as well. The t of M1
money demand is so good that the reader might be tempted to believe that we experimented
a lot to attain it. In fact, we just run one experiment since the di¤erence between M1S money
demand and M1 money demand in the model only depends on  and n. Throughout the
paper we have held n constant at n = 0:5 and  is equal to the optimal , namely 1 = 0:6.
Thus, in the model M1 money demand is 70% of M1S money demand; i.e., 1 0:50:6 = 0:7.
This fraction corresponds to what we see in the data if we take into account a transition
period.
 INSERT TABLE 6 
If we compare the model M1 moments to the empirical counterparts for the period from
1990 to 2013, we nd that the model-implied M1 elasticity and models M1 velocity are too
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high. However, one has to bear in mind that our experiment does not take into account
transition periods that in practice can last for several years. If we take into account a
transition period and calculate the elasticities after the transition only, we get the elasticities
shown in Table 6. In particular, for the period from 1998 to 2013 we nd that the model-
implied elasticity of M1 is not di¤erent from the data at the 95% condence level and the
model-implied M1 velocity is very close to the empirical velocity.
5 ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we perform two robustness checks.
5.1 Money demand shift in 1980 instead of 1990
Lucas and Nicolini (2013) argue that the break in money demand took place in 1980, because
money market deposit accounts were introduced at this time. As a robustness check, we follow
Lucas and Nicolini (2013) and assume that the technological one-time shift in  was realized
in 1980 and that  remained constant thereafter. For this purpose, we recalibrate the model
with 0 = 0 for the period from 1950 to 1979. We obtain a target value of the nominal
interest rate of i = 0:055 and the real interest rate of r = 0:017, which corresponds to a
value of  = (1 + r) 1 = 0:983. Furthermore, the average velocity of money is v = 4:56, and
the elasticity of money demand with respect to the AAA corporate bond yield is  =  0:65.
The markup-target under Kalai and Nash bargaining remains unchanged at  = 0:30. The
calibration results are presented in Table 7 below.
 INSERT TABLE 7 
Calibrating the model to the period from 1950 to 1979 results in a higher welfare cost
of ination. For instance, under competitive pricing we obtain a welfare cost of ination of
1.40 percent as compared to 1.23 percent when we calibrate the model to the 1950 - 1989
period.19 Furthermore, the goods-market share of total output, sGM ; increases by roughly
one percentage point to 5.7 percent.
As before, we search numerically for the value of  that minimizes the squared error
between the model-implied money demand and the data. The simulation results are shown
in Table 8.
 INSERT TABLE 8 
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Table 8 shows that the model is able to replicate the higher velocity of money for the
post-1980 data. However, it fails to replicate the lower elasticity of money demand, since
for the post-1980 data the empirical elasticity is  0:24, while the models elasticity is  0:58.
Below, we argue that this is mainly because of a period of exceptionally high interest rates
in the 1980s. The simulated money demand properties under competitive pricing are shown
in Figure 10.
 INSERT FIGURE 10 
5.2 Taking out the 1980s
The 1980s characterize a period of exceptionally high interest rates. From 1980 to 1989, the
elasticity of money demand is only  0:23, which strongly a¤ects the elasticity for the entire
post-1980 data (where we obtain a value of -0.24). Without the 1980s, the elasticity increases
to  0:31. In what follows, we treat the period from 1980 to 1989 as outliers by using the
parameters calibrated to the period from 1950 to 1979, and then search numerically for the
value of  that minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and
the data in period from 1990 to 2013. The simulation results are shown in Table 9.
 INSERT TABLE 9 
The above table shows that the model is again able to replicate the average velocity in the
post-1990 data. In addition, the models elasticity of  0:45 is much closer to the empirical
elasticity of  0:31 when we exclude the 1980s. We conclude that if we take out 1980s and
assume that the one-time shift in  occurred in 1980, our model does a reasonable job in
replicating the observed break in money demand.
5.3 Discussion
The last two sections have shown that our model is better able to replicate the money demand
behavior if we assume that the "innovation" occurred at the beginning of the 1990s rather
than at the beginning of the 1980s. The initial introduction of money market deposit accounts
occurred in the 1980s and the introduction of the sweep technology in the retail sector at the
beginning of the 1990s. In what follows, we argue that the introduction of money market
deposit accounts played a lesser role. The reason is that from 1980 to 1989 the average
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share of money market mutual funds relative to M1S increased from zero to only 39 percent.
However, after the introduction of the sweep technology in the early 1990s the average share
of money market mutual funds relative to M1S increased further and averaged 93 percent in
the period spanning 1990 to 2013.20 The development of the share of money market mutual
funds relative to M1S is shown in Figure 11 below.
 INSERT FIGURE 11 
In any case, money market deposit accounts and the sweep technology simultaneously
a¤ected money demand. In particular, a sweep technology without MMDAs would have no
e¤ects on money demand, since this technology requires that funds deposited in checking
accounts can be swept to MMDAs. Our model suggests, however, that only after the sweep
technology was introduced did the large changes to money demand occur.
6 LITERATURE
In this section, we discuss several papers in more detail and relate their results to ours.
Lucas and Nicolini (2013). A closely related paper is Lucas and Nicolini (2013). They
rst document the empirical breakdown of the previously stable relationship between M1 and
interest rates that occurred in the 1980s. They, then, discuss the possible factors, such as
nancial deregulation, that could explain the observed breakdown. Finally, they construct a
novel monetary aggregate called NewM1 and show that there is stable negative relationship
between NewM1 and the relevant opportunity cost of holding the various components of
NewM1. In the theory part of their paper, the monetary aggregate is derived endogenously
according to the di¤erent role played by currency, reserves, and commercial bank deposits as
means of payment. They assume two means of exchange (cash and checks). Consumption
goods are of di¤erent sizes and the use of checks in transactions is protable only if the size
of the consumption good is su¢ ciently large. They nd that the new monetary aggregate
performs as well on low and medium frequencies during the period 1915-2008, as was the
case with M1 for the period 1915-1990.
At the time of our writing, we had no access to their new monetary aggregate NewM1.
Faig and Jerez (2007). Our paper is also closely related to Faig and Jerez (2007), who
study money demand and money velocity in a search model with villages, where money
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is necessary for goods transactions. They assume that buyers are subject to idiosyncratic
preference shocks, and only a fraction of them (1   ) can readjust their money holdings
before trading in the goods market. This generates a role for the precautionary demand for
money. Using United States data from 1892 to 2003, Faig and Jerez (2007) show that the
demand for money and the welfare cost of ination decreased dramatically at the end of the
sample. In Table 3, they show that the welfare cost of ination was 0:15 percent in 2003
as opposed to 1 percent for most of the 20th century.21 Their estimates of  are decreasing
over time with  being equal to 1 in 1892, and 0:139 in 2003. They also document that the
demand for precautionary balances almost halved in the last part of the sample, being 47
percent in 2003 as opposed to over 80 percent for all the preceding years, while the velocity
of money showed an upward trend over the second half of the past century.
Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011, BMW hereafter). In the extension section,
BMW introduce bilateral trade credit into the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to in-
vestigate whether this modication can account for the observed downward shift in money
demand. They nd that it can account for this to a large extent, but that the elasticity
of money demand moves in the wrong direction. To replicate the e¤ects of bilateral trade
credit, we perform the same experiment as BMW. That is, we assume that until 1990 the
probability that a bilateral meeting between a buyer and a seller is non-anonymous is zero;
note that bilateral credit is feasible in non-anonymous meetings. After 1990, the probability
that such a meeting is non-anonymous is 1 = 0:30 (see Figure 12). The value of 1 = 0:30 is
chosen numerically, such that the squared error between the model-implied money demand
and the data is minimized.
 INSERT FIGURE 12 
Introducing bilateral trade credit results in a downward shift in money demand and an
increase in the elasticity of money demand, which conicts with the data. In Table 10, we
compare the e¤ects of a one-time increase in  in BMW (i.e., from 0 = 0 to 1 = 0:30) with
the optimal shift suggested by our model (i.e., from 0 = 0 to 1 = 0:60).
 INSERT TABLE 10 
As can be seen from Table 10, modeling nancial intermediation through a money market
as compared to trade credit in BMW, allows us to replicate the change in the elasticity of
money demand more accurately.
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Reynard (2004). Reynard (2004) studies the stability of money demand in the United
States using cross-sectional data. In particular, he relates the evolution of nancial market
participation to the downward shift in the money demand and its higher interest rate elasticity
observed in 1970s. Agents who participate in the nancial market can hold both money
and non-monetary assets (NMAs), whereas the latter are assets that can be converted into
money by paying a transaction cost  examples of NMAs are certicates of deposits, stocks,
and bonds. Agents who do not participate in the nancial market can only hold money.
Reynard (2004) shows that an important component of nancial market participation is the
households real nancial wealth, which increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s, and
that the probability of holding NMAs is positively related to the households wealth. He then
uses the measure of asset market participation to estimate the stability of money demand.
He nds that, as real wealth and the opportunity cost of holding money increased during the
1970s, a higher portion of the population decided to participate in the nancial market and
hold part of their wealth in NMAs. This led to an increase in the interest rate elasticity of
money demand, since only agents who participate in the nancial market can adjust their
portfolio of money and NMAs when interest rates change. Thus, using cross-sectional data,
Reynard (2004) concludes that the money demand remains stable during the post war period,
while previous time-series studies "inappropriately" suggest instability, and their estimates
of the interest rate elasticity are "awed".
Teles and Zhou (2005). Teles and Zhou (2005) also observe that the stable relationship
between M1 and the interest rate broke down at the end of the 1970s. Their view is that M1
ceased to be a good measure of the transaction demand for money after 1980. Before 1980,
there was a clear distinction between M1 and M2: M1 could be used for transactions and
did not yield any rate of return, while M2 o¤ered a positive rate of return, but could not be
used for transactions. Since 1980, this distinction vanished due to changes in regulation, the
development of electronic payments, and the introduction of retail sweep programs. Teles
and Zhou (2005) show that an appropriate measure of the transaction demand for money
after 1980 is provided by the money zero maturity aggregate (MZM). This money aggregate
includes nancial instruments that can be used for transaction immediately at zero cost.
They show that the long-run relationship between the money demand and the interest rate
is restored when M1 is used for the period 1900-1979 and MZM for the period 1980-2003.
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Ireland (2009). Lucass (2000) quanties the welfare costs of ination. Ireland (2009)
revisits the results of Lucas (2000) by using newly available data for the period from 1995
to 2006. This is the period during which sweep retail programs were introduced, thereby
severely distorting the role of M1 as a measure of the transaction demand for money. Owing
to the change in the nature of M1, a new aggregate, M1RS, was used in Irelands (2009)
estimations; M1RS is computed by adding the value of sweep funds into M1. To isolate the
recent behavior of the money demand, Ireland (2009) focuses on two subperiods, 1980-2006
and 1900-1979. He shows that the relationship between M1RS and the interest rate remains
stable in the period after 1980, but that the relationship is di¤erent from the one highlighted
by Lucas (2000). He nds that the modest growth of M1RS observed in earlier data can
be better explained by a semi-log specication of the money demand, as opposed to the
log-log specication proposed by Lucas (2000). Furthermore, the interest rate elasticity of
the money demand seems to be much lower in 1980-2006 data than in 1900-1979 data. Both
these changes lead to estimates of the welfare cost of ination which are lower than those
presented in Lucas (2000).
VanHoose and Humphrey (2001). VanHoose and Humphrey (2001) study the e¤ect
of the introduction of retail sweep accounts on bank reserves and the ability of the Federal
Reserve to conduct monetary policy. In particular, they investigate the e¤ect of lower required
reserve balances on funds-rate volatility and monetary policy in a model of optimal bank
reserve management. They document that the introduction of the retail sweep accounts that
began in 1993 reduced the required bank reserves at the FED by 70 percent. Theoretically,
VanHoose and Humphrey show that lower bank reserves have an ambiguous e¤ect on the
fund-rate volatility. On the one hand, lower reserve requirements reduce the sensitivity of
the demand for reserves and funds borrowing to variations in the Fed-funds rate, which makes
the funds rate more volatile. On the other hand, lower reserve requirements, increase, for any
level of total reserve balances, the portion of reserves the banks can use to cover unexpected
payments, which ultimately reduce the overnight funds demand and so the volatility of the
overnight funds rate. As a result, the composite e¤ect of lower reserve balances on the funds-
rate volatility is ambiguous. Moreover, the higher Fed-funds rate volatility, which may be
triggered by the reduced reserve balances, can be transmitted to the yield curve and raise
the volatility of the short-term interest rate, thereby a¤ecting the e¤ectiveness of monetary
policy. Empirically, VanHoose and Humphrey test for this possibility. They nd that lower
reserve balances increase the short-term interest rate volatility only before the period where
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the Fed publicly announced the target for the funds rate. After the funds-rate target was
announced, the e¤ect of lower reserve requirements on the short-term interest rates was not
signicant.
Baumol-Tobin cash-management models.22 The impact of nancial innovation on
money demand andmoney velocity has also been studied using Baumol-Tobin cash-management
models (e.g., Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli 2002, and Alvarez and Lippi 2009).23 Using micro
data from an Italian survey for the period 1989 - 1995, Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002)
study the implications of the Automated Teller Machine (ATM) card adoption on money
demand, the interest, and the expenditure elasticity of money demand, and the welfare cost
of ination. They show that the interest-rate elasticity for households with an ATM card
is twice as large as it is for households which do not possess one, i.e.,  0:59 as opposed to
 0:27 (Table 3, p.331). Overall, they estimate a welfare cost of ination that equates to
0:06 percent of nondurable consumption. They also show that the welfare cost of ination
is higher for households with an ATM card (0:09 percent) than for households without one
(0:05 percent), and that it is declining over time for each households type (Table 4, p.339).
Using the same data set from 1993 to 2004, Alvarez and Lippi (2009) estimate the e¤ect
of ATM card use on money demand in a model with random withdrawal arrival rates. They
estimate an interest rate elasticity of money demand equal to 0:43 for households with ATM
cards, and 0:48 for households without them (p.391).24 They also show that, as a result of the
nancial innovation, the welfare loss of ination in 2004 is approximately 40 percent smaller
than it was in 1993 (Table VII, p.394).
7 CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the 1990s, the empirical relationship between M1 and interest rates began
to fall apart. In this paper, we ask what accounts for this shift and the lower interest-rate
elasticity of money demand. To answer this question, we construct a microfounded monetary
model with a money market. Agents face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks which generate an
ex-post ine¢ cient allocation of the medium of exchange: some agents will hold cash, but
have no current need for it, while other agents will hold insu¢ cient cash for their liquidity
needs. We nd that the money market a¤ects money demand via two channels. First, it
allows agents who hold cash, but have no current need for it, to earn interest. Second, it
allows agents who hold insu¢ cient cash to borrow and, by doing so, reallocates the existing
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stock of cash more e¢ ciently.
We calibrate the model to U.S. data and nd that a one-time increase in the access
probability to the money market at the beginning of the 1990s replicates the behavior of
money demand well. This result suggests that the introduction of the sweep technology
in the 1990s is to a large extent responsible for the observed empirical changes in money
demand.
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8 APPENDIX A: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. In order to derive equations (8)-(11), we rst characterize the
solutions to the agents decision problems stated in the text.
The rst-order conditions of the agents problem (1) are
U 0(x) = 1, and
@V1
@m+1
= : (16)
The term @V1=@m+1 reects the marginal value of taking one additional unit of money into
the next period, and  is the marginal cost of doing so. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), the
choice of m+1 is independent of m. As a result, each agent exits the centralized market with
the same amount of money, and so the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the
beginning of a period. The envelope conditions are
@V3
@m
= ;
@V3
@d
=  (1 + i) ; and
@V3
@`
=   (1 + i) : (17)
The marginal value of money at the beginning of the centralized market is equal to the price
of money in terms of centralized market goods. This implies that the value function V3 is
linear in m. The value function for a buyer in the goods market is
V b2 (m; `; 0) =  [u (q) + V3 (m  z; `; 0)] + (1  )V3(m; `; 0):
The buyers envelope conditions are
@V b2
@m
= 

u0(q)
@q
@m
+ 

1  @z
@m

+ (1  ); and @V
b
2
@`
=   (1 + i) :
If the buyers constraint (3) is not binding, then @q
@m
= 0 and @z
@m
= 0. In this case, the
buyers rst envelope condition reduces to @V
b
2
@m
= @V3
@m
= . If the constraint is binding, then
@q
@m
= 
g0(q) and
@z
@m
= 1. In this case, the buyers envelope conditions in the goods market
become
@V b2
@m
= 
u0(q)
g0 (q)
+  (1  ) ; and @V
b
2
@`
=   (1 + i) . (18)
The value function for a seller in the goods market is
V s2 (m; 0; d) =  [ q + V3 (m+ z; 0; d)] + (1  )V3(m; 0; d);
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and envelope conditions are
@V s2
@m
= ; and
@V s2
@d
=  (1 + i) : (19)
The rst-order condition of the buyers problem (6) is
@V b2
@m
+
@V b2
@`
= 0: (20)
The rst-order condition of the sellers problem (7) in the money market is
 @V
s
2
@m
+
@V s2
@d
= s: (21)
The envelope condition of (5) is
@V1
@m
= 

(1  n) @V
b
1
@m
+ n
@V s1
@m

+ (1  )

(1  n) @V
b
2
@m
+ n
@V s2
@m

:
Applying the envelope theorem to (6) and (7), the above envelope condition can be rewritten
as
@V1
@m
= 

(1  n) @V
b
2
@m
+ n

@V s2
@m
+ s

+ (1  )

(1  n) V
b
2
@m
+ n
V s2
@m

: (22)
We can now derive the type-A equilibrium equations (8)-(11).
Derivation of (8). The real amount of money an active buyer spends in the goods market,
g(q^), is equal to the real amount of money spent as a passive buyer, g(q), plus the real loan
an active buyer receives from the bank, `.
Derivation of (9) and (10). Assuming s = 0, (21) becomes
 @V
s
2
@m
+
@V s2
@d
= 0: (23)
Substituting @V
b
2
@m
;
@V b2
@`
;
@V s2
@m
; and @V
s
2
@d
from (18) and (19), the rst-order conditions in the money
market, (20) and (23), can be written as (9) and (10), respectively.
Derivation of (11). From (9) and (10), u0(q^) = g0 (q^) : Use s = 0; (18), (19), and u0(q^) =
g0 (q^), to rewrite (22) as follows:
@V1
@m
= + (1  ) (1  n)

u0(q)
g0 (q)
  1

:
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Update this expression by one period and replace @V1
@m+
using (16), to obtain (11).
Proof of Proposition 2. Equations (12)-(15) hold in a type-B equilibrium. Equation (12)
is equal to (8), so we refer to the proof of Proposition 1 for its derivation.
Derivation of (13). Substituting @V
b
2
@m
;
@V b2
@`
;
@V s2
@m
; and @V
s
2
@d
from (18) and (19), the rst-order
conditions in the money market, (20) and (21), become
(13), and i = s, (24)
respectively. Unlike the type-A equilibrium, the deposit constraint is binding here, and
therefore the interest rate is strictly greater than zero in a type-B equilibrium. The second
equation in (24) gives us the value of the multiplier.
Derivation of (14). In a type-B equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money at the
bank; i.e., d = m. Moreover, active buyers carry m^ units of money out of the money market,
where m^ = m+ `; and the market clearing condition in the money market requires that total
deposits must be equal to total loans; i.e., nd =  (1  n) `. Using d = m and m^ = m + `;
the market clearing condition in the money market can be rewritten as m = (1  n) m^.
Multiplying each side of the last equation by ; and using (4), we obtain (14).
Derivation of (15). Use (24) and the envelope conditions in the goods market, (18) and
(19), to rewrite the money market envelope condition (22) as follows
@V1
@m
= 


u0(q^)
g0 (q^)
+ 1  

+ (1  )

(1  n)


u0(q)
g0 (q)
+ 1  

+ n

:
Finally, update this expression by one period and replace @V1
@m+
using (16), to obtain (15).
9 APPENDIX B: PRICING MECHANISMS
The derivation of the terms of trade using the Nash bargaining approach is today a standard
practice in Lagos-Wright-type models. In recent years, however, other pricing mechanisms
such as Kalai bargaining and competitive pricing have received attention.
Kalai bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining solution, the egalitarian solution pro-
posed by Kalai (1977) is strongly monotonic in the sense that no agent is made worse o¤
from an expansion of the bargaining surplus. Because of this property, the Kalai solution has
29
been increasingly used in monetary economics.25 The Kalai bargaining problem is to solve
(q; z) = argmaxu(q)  z
s.t. u(q)  z =  [u(q)  q] and z  m:
When the buyers cash constraint is binding, i.e., m = z, the solution to this problem is
m = gK (q)  q + (1  )u(q): (25)
If m = z, the Kalai solution is di¤erent from the Nash solution, unless  = 0 or  = 1; if
z < m, Nash bargaining and Kalai bargaining yield the same solution. In order to adapt the
model to Kalai bargaining, we only need to replace g (q) with gK (q) ; where the superscript
K stands for Kalai solution.
Competitive market. Assume competitive pricing in the goods market. Then, buyers
and sellers do not bargain over the terms of trade. Instead, they take the price as given in
this market.
Under competitive pricing, it is natural to interpret  and s as participation probabilities.
In particular, let  (s) be the probability that a buyer (seller) participates in the goods
market. Then, the value function of a buyer at the opening of the goods market is
V b2 (m; `) = max
q
"
u (q) + V3 (m  pq; `)
s.t. m  pq:
#
+ (1  )V3(m; `); (26)
where p is the price, and q the quantity of goods he consumes if he enters the goods market.
The rst-order condition to this problem is
u0(q) = p (+ q) ; (27)
where q denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint, m  pq.
The sellers value function at the opening of the goods market is
V s2 (m; d) = 
smax
qs
[ qs + V3 (m+ pqs; d)] + (1  s)V3(m; d): (28)
The rst-order condition to this problem is
p = 1: (29)
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Ifm > pq, the buyer consumes the e¢ cient quantity q, where q solves u0(q) = 1. Ifm = pq,
he spends all his money and consumes q < q. Note that, in equilibrium, an active buyer
holds more money than a passive buyer. This means that q > ^q. It then follows that q^ > q.
The buyers envelope conditions are
@V b2
@m
=  [u0 (q) + 1  ] and @V
b
2
@`
=   (1 + i) , (30)
where we have used (17), (27), and (29). Notice the similarity between (30) and (18). The
two expressions are the same if  = 1.
The sellers envelope conditions are exactly the same as (19); i.e., @V
s
2
@m
= ; and @V
s
2
@d
=
 (1 + i).
Using the buyers budget constraint at equality (i.e., pq = m) and (29) we obtain
m = gC (q)  q; (31)
where the superscript C stands for competitive pricing.
Finally, note that under competitive pricing the goods market clearing condition holds,
i.e.,
(1  n) [q^ + (1  )q] = snqs, (32)
where q^ (q) is the quantity consumed by a buyer who has (does not have) access to the money
market.
10 APPENDIX C: DATA SOURCES
The data we use for the calibration is provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(BGFRS), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRBL), and the U.S. Department of La-
bor: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Table C1 gives an overview about the data sources
that we used for the quantitative analysis.
Insert Table C1 around here.
As the time series of M1 adjusted for retail sweeps of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis is only available from 1967:Q1, we use the series M1SL as a measure of the M1 for
the period from 1959:Q1 to 1966:Q4 and the series M1SA for the period from 1950:Q1 to
31
1958:Q4 (downloadable at http://research.stlouisfed.org/aggreg/). The denition that we
apply to calculate the quarterly value of M1SA is in line with the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis FRED R database and is dened as the average of the monthly data.
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Notes
1Throughout the paper, we use M1S. M1S is called M1RS in Cynamon, Dutkowsky, and Jones (2006b)
and M1ADJ in the St. Louis FRED R database. Detailed information on M1S is available in Cynamon,
Dutkowsky, and Jones (2006b, 2007).
2We use the term nancial innovation for three complementary scenarios: New nancial products can
originate from advances in information technology and science, from changes in nancial regulation, or from
both. A case in point is the Glass-Steagall prohibition against paying interest on commercial bank deposits,
which was in force until 2011. Relaxation of this regulation in the 1980s and 1990s spurred a range of nancial
innovations; such as, MMDAs in the 1980s or sweep accounts in the 1990s (see Teles and Zhou 2005, and
Lucas and Nicolini 2013). Consequently, allowing for MMDAs and the sweep technology were ultimately
policy decisions. When it became clear that the costs of ination were serious, policy makers allowed these
innovations to reduce the cost of ination.
3A MMDA (money market deposit account) is a checking account where the holder is only allowed to
make a few withdrawals per month.
4The monetary model is the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework, and the money market is the same as
the one introduced in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007, BCW hereafter). Our theoretical contribution is
that we consider a limited participation version of BCW.
5The experiment is conducted for three trading protocols: Nash bargaining, Kalai bargaining, and com-
petitive pricing. These di¤erent pricing protocols generate di¤erent quantitative results, but the results are
of an equal qualitative nature.
6Anderson and Rasche (2001, p. 71) conclude their paper that the use of deposit-sweeping software
has made statutory reserve requirements a voluntary constraintfor most banks. That is, with adequately
intelligent software, many banks seem easily to be able to reduce their transaction deposits by a large enough
amount that the level of their required reserves is less than the amount of reserves that they require for day-
to-day operation of the bank. For these banks at least, the economic burden of statutory reserve requirements
is zero.
7The literature on the welfare cost of ination was initiated by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969).
Subsequent works include, but are not limited to, Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981), and Cooley and Hansen
(1989, 1991). Most of these papers are cash-in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function models.
8The basic environment is similar to BCW which builds on Lagos and Wright (2005). The Lagos and
Wright framework is useful, because it allows us to introduce heterogeneity while still keeping the distribution
of money holdings analytically tractable.
9In an earlier version of this paper, we also consider limited commitment of borrowers via banks as in
BCW. Since limited commitment did not a¤ect our calibration results much, we do not present this case here.
10It is routine to show that the rst-best quantities satisfy U 0(x) = 1 and u0(q) = 1.
11The shapes of the curves in Figure 4 do not change qualitatively for  < 1.
12In the model, ib is the interest of a riskless bond that is issued in the settlement market of some period
t and redeemed in the settlement market of period t+ 1. Arbitrage guarantees that ib = =   1. Since the
central bank chooses the growth rate of the money supply  and  is a preference parameter, it is convinient
to assume that the central bank chooses ib.
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13We also experimented with di¤erent values of n and found that for n > 0:5 the shift in money demand
when changing  from 0 = 0 to 1 > 0 becomes more pronounced. However, when we search numerically
for the value of  that minimizes the squared error between the model-implied money demand and the data,
the money demand properties of the model remain essentially unchanged as compared to n = 0:5.
14We use the ratio of nominal GDP to M1 as our target for the velocity of money. Money demand is the
inverse of the velocity of money. Sweep accounts were only introduced in the early 1990s, thus there is no
di¤erence between M1 and M1S in the pre-1990 data.
15Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2011) and Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2011), also use an average
markup of 30 percent. This is the value estimated by Faig and Jerez (2005) for the United States. See
also Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008) for an estimated markup of 32 percent.
16The models velocity of money is derived as follows: The real output in the goods market is YGM =
(1  n)  [m^+ (1  )m], where m^ = g(q^) and M 1 = m = g(q), and the real output in the cen-
tralized market is YCM = A for U (x) = A log(x). Accordingly, the total real output of the economy is
Y = YGM + YCM ; and the model-implied velocity of money is v = Y=M 1.
17The markup-target is only used for the calibrations under Nash bargaining and Kalai bargaining, as the
markup is by denition zero under competitive pricing.
18This is the same measure adopted by Craig and Rocheteau (2008).
19The reason behind the higher welfare cost of ination for the 1950 - 1979 period is mainly attributed to
the higher elasticity of money demand. In order to match  =  0:65, a lower value of  is required, which
results in a less concave utility function. In turn, with a less concave utility function, agents are willing to
give up a higher percentage of total consumption in order to be in a steady state with a nominal interest rate
of 3 percent instead of 13 percent.
20MMMFs and MMDAs both invest in short-term xed income investments. The di¤erence between the two
instruments is that MMDAs are insured by the government, while MMMFs are not. We use the development
of MMMFs as a proxy for the development of the money market in the United States.
21When deriving the welfare cost of ination, Faig and Jerez (2007) consider an increase of the ination
rate from 0 percent to 10 percent.
22In Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), agents face a cash-in-advance constraint, and money can be ex-
changed for other assets at a cost; two well-known extensions of the Baumol-Tobin model are Grossman
and Weiss (1983) and Rotemberg (1984). Examples of inventory-theoretic models of money demand with
market segmentation are Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001), Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002), and Alvarez,
Atkeson and Edmond (2009). Silber (1983) provides a survey of the nancial innovations that occurred in
the period from 1950 to 1980. He argues that both nancial innovations and technological changes respond
to economic incentives, and that both are welfare-improving. In particular, he documents that nancial
innovation improves protection against risk and reduces transaction costs.
23Some recent extensions of Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) have studied exogenous versus endogenous
market segmentation (Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond 2009, and Chiu 2014). In these models, agents decide
to transfer the money from the goods market to the credit market periodically. As a result, only a fraction
of them are able to trade in the credit market at a given point in time. These papers do not investigate the
e¤ect of nancial innovation on the precautionary demand for money.
24Some previous studies on cross-sectional household data report elasticities smaller than 0:25 (e.g., Lippi
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and Secchi 2009, and Daniels and Murphy 1994).
25One of the rst papers to use the Kalai approach in Lagos-Wright-type models is Arouba, Rocheteau and
Waller, (2007). Other applications that followed are Rocheteau and Wright (2013), Lester, Postlewaite and
Wright (2012), He, Wright and Zhu (2012), and Trejos and Wright (2012).
39
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
AAA Interest Rate
M
on
ey
D
em
an
d
M1S 1990 2013 , 0.31
M1 1990 2013 , 0.16
M1 1950 1989 , 0.62
Figure 1: M1 money demand in the United States
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Figure 2: Simulated financial innovation
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Figure 3: Consumed quantities
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Figure 4: Simulated money demand properties
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Figure 5: Money demand with optimal market access
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Figure 6: Initial value of 0 = 0:2
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Figure 7: Money demand with interest-bearing money
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Figure 8: Money demand with interest-free credit
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Figure 9: M1 Money demand with optimal market access
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Figure 10: One-time shift in  in 1980.
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Figure 11: MMMFs relative to M1S
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Figure 12: Simulated bilateral trade credit
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Table 1: Calibration targetsa
Target description Target value
Average real interest rate r 0.027
Average AAA yield 0.070
Average velocity of money 5.217
Retail sector markup 0.300
Elasticity of money demand -0.619 (0.011)
aTable 1 reports the calibration targets and the target values. It also reports the
model t. As explained below we can t all target values exactly. The number in
parentheses refers to the standard error.
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Table 2: Baseline Calibration from 1950 to 1989a
Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Competitive Pricing
0 0 0 0
A 2.147 2.638 2.242
 0.389 0.377 0.309
 0.724 0.760 1.0
1  1.96% 1.64% 1.23%
aTable 2 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters A,  and  for 0 = 0.
Table 2 also displays the welfare cost of ination, 1 , which is the percentage of total
consumption that agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with
a nominal interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent.
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Table 3: Simulation resultsa
Data (1990-2013) Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Comp. Pricing
1 1 1 1
Velocity 6.41 7.05 7.17 7.11
Elasticity -0.31 (0.021) -0.34 (0.004) -0.31 (0.004) -0.33 (0.004)
1 =1 1.04% 0.68% 0.53%
aTable 3 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with
respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market
from 0 = 0 to 1 = 1 in 1990. Table 3 also displays the welfare cost of ination with 1 = 1, 1  =1.
The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 4: Optimal market accessa
Data (1990-2013) Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Comp. Pricing
1 0.64 0.58 0.60
Velocity 6.41 6.41 6.40 6.39
Elasticity -0.31 (0.021) -0.40 (0.005) -0.39 (0.005) -0.40 (0.005)
1 1 1.22% 0.92% 0.69%
i 2.04% 2.62% 2.39%
aTable 4 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with
respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market
from 0 = 0 to the optimal value of 1 in 1990. Table 4 also displays the welfare cost of ination with the
optimal value of 1, 1  1 . The table also shows the critical interest rate, i , that separates the type-A
equilibrium from the type-B equilibrium. The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 5: Competitive pricing - calibration from 1950 to 1989a
Calibration
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
A 1.868 1.513 1.318 1.177
 0.278 0.231 0.204 0.183
1  1.25% 1.25% 1.25% 1.26%
Simulation Data
1 1 1 1 1
Velocity 6.41 6.25 5.58 5.23 5.02
Elasticity -0.31 (0.021) -0.36 (0.005) -0.43 (0.006) -0.48 (0.006) -0.53 (0.007)
1 1 0.66% 0.86% 1.01% 1.14%
aThe rst part of Table 5 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters A and  for 0 = 0:2; 0:4; 0:6;
and 0:8 under competitive pricing. Table 5 also displays the welfare cost of ination under the initial value of
0, 1 . The second part of Table 5 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity
of money demand with respect to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the
money market from the initial value of 0 to 1 = 1 in 1990. Table 5 also displays the welfare cost of ination
with 1 = 1, 1 1 . The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 6: M1 elasticitiesa
Model: 90-13 Data: 90-13 Data: 95-13 Data: 96-13 Data: 97-13 Data: 98-13
Velocity 9.12 8.27 8.66 8.77 8.85 8.90
Elasticity -0.40 (0.005) +0.16 (0.067) -0.10 (0.075) -0.20 (0.070) -0.29 (0.065) -0.37 (0.064)
aTable 6 displays the velocity of M1 and the elasticity of M1 money demand with respect to the AAA
interest rate for several subperiods in the post-1990 data. For the simulation, we assumed competitive
pricing in the goods market. The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 7: Calibration from 1950 to 1979a
Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Competitive Pricing
0 0 0 0
A 1.881 2.333 1.971
 0.341 0.336 0.254
 0.675 0.707 1.0
1  2.26% 2.04% 1.40%
aTable 7 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters A,  and  for 0 = 0.
Table 7 also displays the welfare cost of ination, 1 .
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Table 8: Optimal market accessa
Data (1980-2013) Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Comp. Pricing
1 0.71 0.68 0.69
Velocity 6.64 6.97 7.03 6.99
Elasticity -0.24 (0.012) -0.58 (0.008) -0.58 (0.009) -0.58 (0.009)
1 1 1.44% 1.12% 0.79%
i 1.32% 1.62% 1.49%
aTable 8 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect
to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in 1980 of the access probability to the money market from
0 = 0 to the optimal value of 1. Table 8 also displays the welfare cost of ination with the optimal value of
1, 1 1 . The table also shows the critical interest rate, i , that separates the type-A equilibrium from the
type-B equilibrium. The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 9: Optimal market access: 1990 to 2013a
Data (1990-2013) Nash Bargaining Kalai Bargaining Comp. Pricing
1 0.76 0.69 0.72
Velocity 6.41 6.44 6.43 6.43
Elasticity -0.31 (0.021) -0.46 (0.006) -0.45 (0.006) -0.45 (0.006)
1 1 1.41% 1.11% 0.77%
i 1.09% 1.56% 1.35%
aTable 9 displays the simulation results of the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with respect
to the AAA interest rate after a one-time increase in the access probability to the money market from 0 = 0
to the optimal value of 1 in 1990. Table 9 also displays the welfare cost of ination with the optimal value of
1, 1 1 . The table also shows the critical interest rate, i , that separates the type-A equilibrium from the
type-B equilibrium. The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table 10: Comparison of resultsa
Data 1990-2013 BMW Our model
Velocity 6.41 6.41 6.39
Elasticity -0.31 (0.021) -0.81 (0.009) -0.40 (0.005)
aTable 10 displays the velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand with
respect to the AAA interest rate for the period from 1990 to 2013 in BMW and in
our model. For the simulation, we assumed competitive pricing in the goods market.
The numbers in parentheses refer to the standard errors.
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Table C1: Data source
Description Identier Source Period Frequency
Consumer price index CPIAUCSL BLS 50:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
M1 money stock M1SL BGFRS 59:Q1-66:Q4 quarterly
Sweep-adjusted M1 M1ADJ FRBL 67:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Nominal GDP GDP BEA 50:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
AAA Moodys corporate bond AAA BGFRS 50:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Money market mutual funds MMMFFAQ027S BGFRS 50:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
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